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COMMENTS
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS:
THE LAST CIVIL RICO CAUSE OF ACTION
THAT WORKS
THOMAS P. HEED*
Civil RICO is an unusually potent weapon--the litigation equivalent
of a thermonucleardevice.'
INTRODUCTION
Barry Yew worked for Western Electronic Enterprise Company (WEE Co.) as an engineer for many years.2 WEE Co. was a
medium-sized company located in Illinois that designed and built
small lots of specialized proprietary integrated circuits for many
high technology industries. Mr. Yew designed computer chips and
industrial controls, and he became familiar with many of WEE
Co.'s proprietary designs, manufacturing processes and vendors
during the course of his employment. Due to his years of experience, Mr. Yew was even entrusted with the keys to the locked file
cabinets which contained WEE Co.'s most sensitive business information. As a result of an unexpected, simultaneous contraction
in both the defense and computer industries, WEE Co. had to
downsize. Mr. Yew was assigned a new job during the reorganization, and he hated it. As a result, he decided to seek new
employment.
Mr. Yew applied for a job at United System Electrodes and
Microelectronics, Incorporated (USEME, Inc.), a large manufacturer of integrated circuits located in Wisconsin. USEME, Inc. was
immediately interested in Mr. Yew due to his years of design experience. During Mr. Yew's first interview, USEME, Inc.'s Director of Engineering, Mr. Craft, said that he had always wanted to
* J.D. Candidate, 1998.
1. Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991).

2. The fact pattern presented herein is purely hypothetical and is used to
illustrate the main points of this Comment. Any similarities between the hypothetical fact pattern and any person, corporation or other fact pattern is
purely coincidental.
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get his hands on some of WEE Co.'s technology. Although Mr.
Craft did not ask directly, Mr. Yew recognized Mr. Craft's comment as a request for documents. Mr. Yew said that he would see
what he could do-if he was hired.
USEME, Inc. promptly requested a second interview with Mr.
Yew. On the day of second interview, Mr. Yew called in sick because he was out of personal and vacation days. The second interview was a formality, and USEME tendered Mr. Yew an attractive job offer. Mr. Yew accepted the offer but delayed
resigning from WEE Co. for one week because he wanted to copy
some documents for USEME, Inc. Every night for that week, Mr.
Yew surreptitiously misappropriated copies of customer lists and
manufacturing processes out of WEE Co's locked files.3 He also
took computer diskettes and drawings containing some of WEE's
proprietary designs.
Upon starting his new job, Mr. Yew gave Mr. Craft WEE Co.'s
trade secrets. Mr. Yew was immediately assigned to a project team
which had the task of incorporating WEE Co.'s designs into
USEME, Inc.'s products. Several weeks later, USEME, Inc.'s VicePresident of Operations, Mr. Big, stopped Mr. Yew in a corridor
and congratulated him for giving WEE Co.'s sensitive business information to USEME, Inc.
Within a year, WEE Co. was losing market-share and was suffering from shrinking profit margins. USEME, Inc. introduced a
new generation of chips which were similar in operation to those
made by WEE Co. WEE Co. knew that these designs were not
amenable to reverse engineering4 and was suspicious that USEME
3. According to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, an employee misappropriates a trade secret when the employee knows that knowledge of the trade secret was acquired under conditions giving rise to a duty of secrecy and yet
discloses or uses the trade secret without express or implied consent. Derek
P. Martin, An Employer's Guide to Protecting Trade Secrets from Employee

Misappropriation, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 949, 951-52 (1993). According to the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, a trade secret is any "formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information" which gives a business an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information. Peter J.G. Toren, The Prosecution of Trade Secrets Thefts Under FederalLaw, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 59, 59 n. 1
(1994) (citing the RESTATEMENT).

f The RESTATEMENT lists six factors which can be used in determining
whether a particular formula, pattern, device or compilation of information is
a trade secret: 1) the extent to which the information is known outside the
business; 2) the extent to which the information is known to the employees
within the business; 3) the safeguards taken to protect the information; 4)
the value of the information; 5) the money and effort used to develop the information; and 6) the ability of others to properly acquire or duplicate the information. Id. The misappropriation of trade secrets and the theft of trade
secrets will be used interchangably throughout this Comment.

4. Reverse engineering is the study and recomposition of unpatented ar-

ticles. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155
(1989). Reverse engineering is a protected right of the public at large unless
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had wrongfully acquired the technology. WEE Co. subsequently
learned that all the adverse developments were the result of Mr.
Yew supplying USEME, Inc. with confidential business documents. The President of WEE Co. found out that USEME, Inc.
had also encouraged the ex-employees of other companies to steal
trade secrets including Mr. Smith, formerly of XYZ Corp.
The President of Wee Co. consulted an attorney about suing
USEME, Inc. The attorney explained that legal fees and litigation
expenses for such a suit could easily exceed $500,000.6 After doing
a cost-benefit analysis, the board of directors of WEE Co. concluded that legal action would be imprudent because of the highly
speculative nature of civil litigation.6
WEE Co. is a fictitious victim of the burgeoning problem of
corporate espionage in America.' As Wee Co. discovered, a victim
of trade secret theft often encounters a lose-lose proposition: First
the company loses the trade secrets, then the company learns that
it does not have any effective civil remedies for their loss.8 Howthe product has been patented. Id. The threat of reverse engineering is one
way to spur inventors to meet the rigorous requirements for patents which
Congress has set. See Id. Reverse engineering is also defined as the process
of starting with a known product and working backwards to divine the technology which aided in its development or manufacture, Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
5. David J. Lynch, Companies on the Lookout for Spies, USA TODAY, Feb.
24, 1995, at 4B. Seeking judicial relief through the courts for the misappropriation of trade secrets costs an average of $500,000 in legal fees. Id.
6. In Town of Newton v. Rumery, the Supreme Court acknowledged the
speculative nature of civil litigation. 480 U.S. 386, 390 (1987). Rumery alleged that he was wrongly arrested by the Newton police. Id. The town
prosecutor offered to drop the charges against Rumery only if he released the

town from liability for false arrest. Id. at 390-91. Rumery signed the release,
but then attempted to sue the town anyway. Id. at 391. The Supreme Court
held that the release was valid and noted the certain benefit of escaping
criminal prosecution outweighed the speculative benefit of prevailing in a civil
lawsuit. Id. at 394.
7. From the beginning of 1985 to the beginning of 1994, the theft of proprietary business information increased 260%. Michael J. McDermott, Is International Marketing a Game of Spy versus Spy?, BRANDWEEK, June 20,
1994, at 31. From the end of 1993 to the end of 1995, an American Society for
Industrial Security survey reported that trade secrets theft tripled. Carl
Quintanilla, Tiny Cameras,Bugs and Secret Agents May Be Snooping on Your
Business Trip, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995, at B1. Security industry analysts
do not see the growth of trade secret theft abating. Id. Michael Hansen, a
security consultant with Northwestern Countermeasures Inc., says, "[t]he
problem is going to get worse before it gets better." Id.
8. Jennifer M. Bagley et al., Intellectual Property, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
457, 458 (1995). The threat of civil sanctions do not deter those who steal
trade secrets. Id. Civil damages and legal expenses are considered "just an-

other cost of doing business." Id. However, the victims of trade secrets theft
are reluctant to bring criminal action. Toren, supra note 3, at 59. Companies
are reluctant because they perceive that their rights are not sufficiently protected by criminal statutes, many prosecutors do not have the technical ex-
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ever, victims of trade secrets misappropriation will find that a civil
action utilizing the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provides an adequate remedy. Using RICO, an
economically injured party can receive triple damages plus legal
fees.9 Moreover, a RICO suit will attach a stigma to the defendant. 0 Although civil RICO actions have been substantially limited by judicially-created rules over the last decade, a properly
pleaded complaint alleging the misappropriation of trade secrets
based upon facts analogous to those in the hypothetical meets all
of the required statutory elements and judicially imposed rules."
This Comment proposes that compelling reasons exist for allowing the victims of trade secrets theft to use civil RICO and that
such a cause of action is still viable despite the many judicially imposed restrictions. Part I of this Comment discusses the problem
of misappropriated trade secrets. Part II reviews the development
of RICO from the organized-crime hearings of the 1950s and 1960s
to the present day. Finally, Part III examines the applicability of
RICO to the misappropriation of trade secrets problem.
I. THE PROBLEM OF MISAPPROPRIATED TRADE SECRETS
The problem of misappropriated trade secrets in this country
has two components: 1) the actual theft of trade secrets; and 2) the
lack of any effective remedy. The extent of the trade secrets theft
problem is exemplified by its sheer magnitude, by the concern of
industrial security experts and by its threat to American industrial
competitiveness. The lack of an effective legal remedy is illustrated by the impediments to bringing a civil action for the misappropriation of trade secrets.
A. Extent of the Problem

Trade secrets are misappropriated in one of two ways: 1) an
employee or ex-employee takes the trade secrets before or upon
pertise to handle a trade secrets case, the trade secrets might be subject to
additional public disclosure because court records are open to the public and
the company loses control of the criminal case. Id. at 59-60 n.3.
9. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(c) (1994). "Any person injured in his business or property by reason of

a violation of § 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. For
relevant portions of § 1962, see infra notes 65-68.
10. William E. Marple, "Pattern"Requirement Renders RICO Inapplicable
to Ordinary Business Disputes, 14 REv. LITIG. 343, 364 (1995). Allegations of

racketeering "besmirch" the reputation of the defendant company and the

company's employees. Id.
11. See infra notes 239-58 and accompanying text for a full discussion of
how a misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action meets the common
judicially imposed rules of a civil RICO lawsuit.
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termination,' 2 or 2) the employee or agent of an economic competitor (often foreign) intentionally steals them. 3 The misappropriation' of trade secrets is costing American businesses billions of
dollars.' 5 Corporate loss estimates range from $1.8 billion"6 to $24
billion annually. 7 "[Alt least six million American jobs have been
lost this decade" as a result of industrial espionage. 8 In an annual
industrial survey, one-half of all companies reported being victimized by trade secret theft in 1992 alone. 9 Even with such alarming
numbers, some industry analysts are more concerned with the
misappropriations of trade secrets' growth trend.0
Between 1985 and 1994, the reported incidents of misappropriated trade secrets rose 260%. 2' This trend is exhibiting signs of

unbridled growth as evidenced by the tripling of reported incidents

12. Kerry Fehr-Snyder, Employers Stung by Stolen Trade Secrets, PHOENIX

GAZ., June 1, 1994, at Al. Fifty-eight percent of the loses attributable to the
misappropriations of trade secrets are caused by current of former employees.
Id. Approximately 70% of all commercial espionage cases involve current or
former employees. Lynch, supra note 5, at 4B.
13. McDermott, supra note 7, at 31. The theft of trade secrets by foreign
companies and governments has grown to such a level that it poses a credible
threat to U.S. industrial competitiveness. Id. Additionally, the purposeful
theft of computers and briefcases from hotels and airport terminals by economic competitors is growing rapidly. Quintanilla, supra note 7, at B1. The
thieves are looking for trade secrets contained within the briefcases and laptops. Id. The problem has forced many large corporations to issue travel advisories which warn their employees of the dangers. Id.
14. For the purposes of this Comment, "misappropriation of trade secrets,"
"theft of trade secrets," and "corporate espionage" all refer to the unauthorized and illegal acquisition of a corporation's trade secrets.
15. Robert Bellinger, Trade-Secret Theft Takes Big Bite Out of Valley,
ELEC. ENG'G TIMES, Dec. 11, 1995, at 126.
16. Toren, supra note 3, at 62.

17. Id. (citing an annual cost to American firms from the misappropriation
of trade secrets of $1.8 billion); Bellinger, supra note 15, at 126 (citing an annual cost to American firms of $15 billion); Bill Gertz, Economic Spying Increases Fourfold: Company Employees Often at Fault, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20,

1996, at A7 (citing a monthly cost to American firms of $2 billion dollars, representing a cost of approximately $24 billion annually); Martin, supra note 3,
at 949 (citing an annual cost to American firms of nearly $20 billion).
18. Jack Anderson, Industrial Espionage Costs Billions, STATE J. REG.
(Springfield, Ill.), Mar. 10, 1996, at 16.
19. Bob Williams, The Spies Who Came in from the Cold War, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Jan. 16, 1994, at Fl. In a survey of 5000 companies,
the American Society for Industrial Security found that nearly 50% of the
companies were victims of trade secret theft in 1992. Id. In 1991, only 37% of
the companies were victims of trade secret theft. Id.

20. Quintanilla, supra note 7. Industry analysts do not see the growth in
trade secrets theft abating. Id. This is a cause for alarm for many security
industry analysts. Id. Michael Hansen, a security-information consultant
with Northwest Countermeasures Inc., projects that the problem will get far
worse if nothing is done. Id.
21. See Gertz, supra note 17; McDermott, supra note 7, at 31.
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in just the last two years.22 These grim numbers understate the
true problem since they only account for reported thefts.3 Many
companies now actively attempt to misappropriate the trade secrets of economic competitors.24 Concern also exists that the
growing involvement of foreign companies and governments could
make the problem worse, and could even undermine America's industrial competitiveness.22 Amid these worrisome statistics, many
experts feel that the current litigation options and legal remedies
are inadequate.26
B. Problems with Litigatinga Misappropriationof Trade Secrets
Case
Companies that have trade secrets stolen typically sue in civil

22. Quintanilla, supra note 7.
23. Ira S. Somerson, Information: What it Costs When it's Lost, SEC.
MGMT., Oct. 1, 1994, at 61; Cf Toren, supra note 3, at 59-60 n.3 (noting that

companies are hesitant to report trade secrets theft). Since companies are
reluctant to report the theft of proprietary information, the statistics probably
underestimate the size of the problem. Id.
24. Quintanilla, supra note 7.
25. McDermott, supra note 7, at 31; cf Anne Eisele, U.S. Urged: Be
Tougher on Economic Espionage, NEW TECH. WK, 1995 WL 9015509, Aug. 21,
1995, at *1 (citing a report drafted by the National Counterintelligence Center
which states that the industries most targeted for "foreign industrial espionage are those producing 'classified products'. . . dual-use technology, and
leading-edge technologies critical to maintaining U.S. economic security").
Increasingly, foreign governments and foreign companies are involved in corporate espionage. Id. Recently, the CIA recently identified six countries
which are actively spying on corporations within the U.S.: France, Israel,
China, Russia, Iran, and China. CIA Names Names on Espionage, Chic. Trib.,
Aug. 15, 1996, at 8. According to former F.B.I. Director William Sessions,
foreign governments and foreign corporations consider economic information
about individual American companies to be of strategic importance. Toren,
supra note 3, at 60 n.4. As a result, both foreign governments and foreign
companies are increasingly misappropriating the trade secrets of American
companies. McDermott, supra note 7, at 31.
However, by misappropriating trade secrets on U.S. soil, foreign nationals
and foreign companies are potentially subjecting themselves to U.S. jurisdiction under RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1994). "Any civil action or proceeding
under this chapter [RICO] against any person may be instituted in the district
court of the United States for any district in which such person resides, is
found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs." Id.
26. Eisele, supra note 25, at *1. The Congressional Report on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage found that U.S. law afforded intellectual property inadequate protection. Id. Additionally, the FBI officially
made the misappropriations of trade secrets one of its top priorities. Id. Recognizing that current enforcement tools were inadequate, the FBI expanded a
Cold War information program called "Development of Espionage, Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Awareness" (DECA). Id. The DECA program briefs members of the business community on illicit attempts to gather
information by corporations and foreign governments. Id.
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court.27 Unfortunately, civil actions do not deter most information
thieves, 28 and the cost to the plaintiff can be prohibitive. 29 The average civil action for the misappropriation of trade secrets costs
the plaintiff up to $500,000 in legal fees.30 On the other side of the
equation, the penalties do not deter trade secrets thieves because
the potential civil sanctions are viewed as just another cost of doing business.3'
Pursuing criminal prosecution is not a viable option for victims of trade secrets theft for a variety of additional reasons.
Companies are reluctant to seek criminal prosecution because of
the difficulties of gathering evidence in trade secrets cases,32 the
3
lack of protection for the victimM
and the perceived lack of techni-

cal expertise on the part of many prosecutors.34 Perhaps the largest impediment to criminal prosecution is the threat of public disclosure of the trade secrets,35 which would destroy their residual
value.36 Until recently, no federal statute even existed which made
the misappropriation of trade secrets illegal. 7 The economic im27. Toren, supra note 3, at 59.
28. Bagley et al., supra note 8, at 458.
29. See Lynch, supra note 5, at 4B (discussing the exorbitant costs of litigation).
30. Id.

31. Bagley et al., supra note 8, at 458.
32. Cf Toren, supra note 3, at 60 n.3 (noting that prosecutors lack the
technical expertise for such a case and the victim relinquishes control of the
case).
33. Id. Victims are not afforded proper protection by criminal statutes, victims have no control over the case and sensitive business information may be
disclosed to the public as part of the judicial process. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. The public has a presumption of access to the records of criminal
trials and proceedings. Id. A company's competitors can freely use any in-

formation which is in the public record of the trial. Id.
Although a trade secret is discoverable during litigation, the trade secret
owner is entitled to protection under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 147 (2d ed., Prentiss-Hall 1989). A discovery request may be quashed at the courts discretion
under Rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules in order to prevent public dissemination
or to prevent the competing company from learning the trade secret. Id.
However, with both sides employing this rule, they must have a high degree of
confidence in the legal system. Elisa Williams, A Santa Ana Maker of Industrial Seals Gets $10 Million from a Competitor, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec.
28, 1994, at C1. Since neither side will be able to review all of the evidence,
both sides must "trust their attorneys to interpret events and decide whether
the case is worth continuing." Id.
36. See Williams, supra note 35, at 3.
37. Julie Fustanio, Biz Espionage Now Targeted by Specific Law, Wis. ST.

J., Oct. 8, 1996, at C1. On October 11, 1996, President Clinton signed the

Economic Espionage Act of 1996 into law. Clinton Approves Intelligence
Spending Rise; Bill Is Also Signed to Make Theft of Trade Secrets a Federal
Crime, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1996, at A6. The Act outlaws both economic espionage and trade secrets theft. The Econ. Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
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pact of trade secrets theft on the economy and the lack of an adequate remedy are analogous to the concerns which inspired the
RICO statute. 8
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RICO FROM 1970-1996

RICO is part of the Organized Crime Control Act (OCC) of
1970."9 Congress enacted OCC amid growing concerns about the
increasing power of organized crime and the failure of existing law
enforcement tools to stop it.4° First, this Part discusses the con-

cerns about organized crime which prompted the adoption of OCC
and RICO. Next, this Part reviews the RICO statute focusing on
the congressionally created racketeering definitions, the causes of
action and the civil remedy. Lastly, this Part examines the history
of judicial hostility towards RICO along with the concomitant ju104-294, § 101, 110 Stat. 3488, available in Westlaw PL 104-294, at *1-3
(1996). Economic espionage is defined as misappropriating trade secrets for
the benefit of a foreign government, instrumentality or agent. Id. at *2 Individuals convicted of economic espionage can be sentenced to not more than 15
years in prison and fined not more than $500,000. Id. An organization convicted under the Act can be fined not more than $10,000,000. Id. An individual convicted of trade secrets theft can be imprisoned not more than 10 years
and fined not more than $500,000. Id. An organization convicted of trade secrets theft can be fined not more than $5,000,000. Id.
The Act's civil remedy is very limited. Id. at *3-4. The only civil remedy is
injunctive relief to enjoin the use of a misappropriated trade secret. Id. at *3.
However, the Act does not preempt any other federal or state civil remedy for
the misappropriation of trades secrets. Id. at *4. In addition, the Act prevents disclosure of trade secrets during any prosecution pursuant to the Act.
Id. at *3.

The facts adduced in a criminal prosecution under this act may facilitate a
civil action under RICO much as the facts adduced in a criminal anti-trust
prosecution are often used in a civil anti-trust suit. Cf. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 317 (1965) (noting
that Congress intended that the Clayton Act "minimize the burdens of litigation for injured private suitors by making available to them all matters previously established by the Government"). However, The Economic Espionage
Act has no provisions for tolling any civil action pending a federal prosecution
nor for explicitly making any criminal judments or decrees prima facie evidence in a related civil suit. Cf The Econ. Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-294, § 101, 110 Stat. 3488, available in Westlaw PL 104-294, at *1-4
(1996) (lacking any provision for tolling civil actions or for making criminal
judgments prima facie evidence in related civil trial); Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 381 U.S. at 313-16 (noting that (1) while the government is pursuing
antitrust actions against a defendant, the Clayton Act tolls the statute of limitations for bringing a private antitrust suit, and (2) after resolution of a civil
or criminal action brought by the government, a private party may use any
judgment or decree as prima facie evidence in a subsequent civil suit).
38. See infra notes 209-27 and accompanying text for a discussion on organized crime and corporate misappropriation of trade secrets parallels.
39. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCC), 84 STAT. 922, 941-47
(1970). The actual RICO provisions of the statute (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968)
were §§ 901-904 of the OCC. Id. at 941-47.
40. OCC, 84 STAT., at 922-23 (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
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dicially created rules it produced.
A. CongressionalFindings on Organized Crime Circa 1970
Congressional inquiry into organized crime began with hearings conducted by Senator Kefauver in 1951.4' The Kefauver
hearings inspired Senator McClellan to further investigate organized crime throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s.42 After
nearly two decades of consideration, a congressional consensus finally existed that a systematic legislative attack was warranted. 3
As a result, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was passed."
Congress prefaced the OCC with five findings: 1) that organized crime was a sophisticated and widespread activity which
drained billions of dollars from the economy; 2) that crime syndicates acquired a great deal of their power through illegally obtained wealth; 3) that the illegally obtained wealth was used to
infiltrate legitimate business; 4) that these activities caused grave
damage to individual investors, competing organizations and the
economy; and 5) that organized crime was a growing phenomenon
for which no effective law enforcement tools existed."5
The stated goal of RICO was the eradication of organized
crime.40 In order to give maximum effect to the act, Congress used
"self-consciously" broad language 47 and expressed a desire that the
41. Michael Goldsmith, Judicial Immunity for White-Collar Crime: The
Ironic Demise of Civil Rico, 30 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 4 (1993). The Kefauver
Committee was the first congressional body to observe the troublesome practice of organized crime buying legitimate businesses with ill-gotten fruits. Id.
at 4 n.18.
42. Id. at 4-5.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1 n.2.
45. OCC, 84 STAT. at 922-23.
46. Id. In addition to the five findings, Congress also stated that the purpose of the act was the eradication of organized crime. Id. This goal was facilitated by strengthening evidence-gathering tools of law enforcement agencies, by establishing new crimes, by increasing penalties and by creating new
remedies. Id.
47. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (citing United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). Sedima, a Belgian corporation, and
Imrex, an American company, created a joint venture to export electronic
components to Belgium. Id. at 483. Belgian consumers placed orders through

Sedima which in turn ordered the parts from Imrex. Id. Imrex then shipped
the parts to Europe. Id. Under the agreement, the two companies split the

net profits. Id. at 484.
Sedima alleged that Imrex purposely inflated bills, thereby cheating
Sedima out of its. share of the proceeds by demanding reimbursement for fictitious expenses. Id. Sedima filed a civil RICO suit against Imrex. Id. The
district court dismissed the RICO counts because Sedima did not allege an
injury related to the pattern of racketeering activity as opposed to the predicate felonies themselves. Id. The district court did not establish any exact
formula, holding only that in a cause of action based on a violation of § 1962(c)
of RICO a plaintiff must allege either a racketeering or competitive injury. Id.
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act be liberally construed."8 However, before Congress could enact
legislation to eradicate organized crime it had to define what activities constituted racketeering.
B. CongressionallyEnacted Organized Crime Definitions
Four elements are common to all RICO theories of liability:
'person,' 'enterprise,' 'racketeering activity' and 'pattern of racketeering activity.' 9 RICO defines a 'person' as an individual or entity capable of holding legal title.' An 'enterprise' is any association in fact of individuals, corporations, partnerships or
associations. 1 'Racketeering activity' is any of a number of federal
and state criminal violations, referred to as predicate felonies.52 A
'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of the
enumerated predicate offenses committed within ten years of one
another.53 Due to statutory vagueness, the United States Supreme
A divided court of appeals affirmed the decision. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id. at 486. The
Court held that the statute was to be interpreted broadly and that no distinct
racketeering injury was required. Id. at 497-500. The Supreme Court's holdings in Sedima defined the interpretive guidelines for RICO for the lower
courts. Id. at 493-500. It held that a violation of § 1962 (c) "requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity," an
injury to the plaintiffs business or property as a result of the conduct and
nothing else. Id. A broad interpretation of RICO is appropriate because of
the general principles surrounding the statute and the "self-consciously"
broad language Congress used in the statute. Id. The Supreme Court held
that Congress had the power to pass expansive legislation, and therefore, a
broad interpretation of RICO was both proper and constitutional. See id. at
486. The Court noted that Congress used broad language in enacting RICO
and any defects in RICO which resulted in its expanisve use were for Congress to correct. Id. Additionally, the Court held that the use of RICO
against purportedly "innocent businesses" was a matter that only Congress
could address, not the courts. Id. at 499-500.
48. 84 STAT. 947 (1973).
49. Id. at 942-43.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1994).
51. Id. § 1961(4).
52. Id. § 1961(1). Racketeering activity encompasses over 40 state and federal crimes. Id. The common law state crimes which are proscribed are murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion and drug dealing. Id. § 1961(1)(A). Among the proscribed federal crimes are bribery, sports
bribery, counterfeiting, theft of interstate shipments, embezzlement from
pension or welfare funds, charging extortionate credit rates, transmitting
gambling information, wire fraud, mail fraud, obstruction of justice, obstruction of criminal investigation, obstruction of law enforcement official, interfering with commerce, interstate transportation of gambling paraphernalia, receiving unlawful welfare payments, running an illegal gambling business,
interstate shipment of stolen goods, receiving interstate shipment of stolen
goods, trafficking in contraband cigarettes, white slave trafficking, embezzling
union funds, undue influence of union official and securities fraud. Id. §
1961(1)(B)-(D).
53. Id. § 1961(5). The predicate felonies are enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(A)-(D). The pattern of racketeering activity in no way constitutes an
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Court imposed additional requirements to prove a 'pattern of racketeering activity.' u
According to the Supreme Court, continuity plus relationship
combine to create a pattern." The Court held that continuity could
be both a closed and an open-ended concept. 6 A closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity is an extended period of past, repeated, related racketeering activity.57 An open-ended pattern of
racketeering activity is illegal conduct which, by its nature, is ongoing or threatens to be on-going."' Sporadic conduct or conduct
over a short duration of time cannot establish a pattern of racketenterprise, rather it is a separate and distinct element of a RICO offense.
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 574, 583 (1981). The enterprise is an entity consisting of RICO "persons" associated in fact. Id. The pattern of racketeering activity is a series of criminal acts perpetrated by the RICO person(s). Id. The enterprise is proved by evidence showing an on-going
organization, formal or informal, legitimate or illegitimate. Id. The pattern of
racketeering is established by evidence proving that the RICO person(s)
committed at least two of the requisite predicate felonies within the last ten
years. Id.
54. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237 (1988). The
local telephone company attempted to influence the utility rate board by giving board members cash, parties, meals, sports tickets, and promises of future
employment. Id. at 233. The Court held that telephone company's activities
constituted a pattern because they endured for six years and were related to
each other. Id. at 250.
The Court held that the pattern of racketeering activity defined by 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) does not define a pattern so much as it establishes a minimum condition necessary for the existence of a pattern. Id. at 237. In order to
establish a pattern, the predicate offenses must be related and continuous (or
pose the threat of being continuous). Id. at 239. Criminal acts are related if
they share common perpetrators, victims, crimes, objectives or other attributes. Id. at 240. The legislative history of RICO requires not only relatedness
but continuity. Id. The Court held that a prosecutor or plaintiff must prove
either past continuity of racketeering activity or the threat of continued racketeering activity in the future. Id. at 241. The inquiry into continuity is factspecific, but if previous illicit behavior was ongoing over an extended period of

time, the activity was continuous. Id. at 242.
The Court gave two examples, which were not intended as an exhaustive
list, of what constitutes a threat of an on-going pattern of racketeering activity. Id. First, a pattern is established if a long-term threat of racketeering
activity exists. Id. For example, if a hoodlum extorts "protection" money from
a storekeeper under implicit threat, a pattern is established. Id. The threat
of the hoodlum returning every month for the next installment of the premium is real. Id. Second, the threat of continued racketeering activity can be
established by showing that the predicate felonies constitute an enterprise's
way of doing business. Id. For example, a long-term association that exists
for illicit purposes establishes a threat of future racketeering activity. Id. at
243. Similarly, continuity is established if the predicate acts constitute a legitimate enterprise's way of doing business. Id. In no way will predicate acts
committed over a few weeks or a couple of months constitute a pattern. Id.
55. Id. at 240.
56. Id. at 241.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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eering activity. 9 Furthermore, the predicate felonies must exhibit
the element of relatedness. 60 The Supreme Court held that criminal conduct which has the same or similar purpose, objective, perpetrators, victims or modus operandi is related.6 Two isolated and
unrelated criminal offenses cannot establish a pattern.62 Person,
enterprise, racketeering activity and pattern of racketeering activity combine in four distinct ways to constitute a RICO violations.6
C. Statutory Violations of RICO
A civil RICO action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c) is dependent
upon a showing of damage caused by a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1962.6 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, Congress created four fundamental RICO offenses whereby it is illegal for a person: a) to use income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in order to acquire, establish or operate an enterprise involved in interstate or
foreign commerce;' b) to acquire or maintain an interest, through
a pattern of racketeering activity, in any enterprise engaged in interstate commerce;" c) to conduct the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity;67 and d) to conspire to

59. Id. at 239.
60. Id. at 237.
61. See id. at 240 (citing with approval Congress's definition in Title X of
the pattern requirement in terms of the relationship of the perpetrator's acts
on to another). Other conduct or acts which are connected by any relevant
distinguishing characteristic are also considered related for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
62. Id.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
64. Id. § 1964(c).
65. Id. § 1962(a). The text of this subsection is as follows:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person whohas received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in,
or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
66. Id. § 1962(b). The text of this subsection is as follows:
(b) It shall be unlawful for any personthrough a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain,
directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which
is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
Id.
67. Id. § 1962(c). The text of this subsection is as follows:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
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commit any of the first three offenses.6 Person, racketeering activity and pattern of racketeering activity are identical for all four
RICO violations.
The enterprise fulfills a different function under each of
RICO's four provisions. 9 Under subsection (a), the enterprise is
the beneficiary of the income derived via a pattern of racketeering
activity.70 Under subsection (b), the enterprise is the victim acquired with the illicitly derived income.7 Under subsection (c), the
enterprise is the instrumentality of the pattern of racketeering activity.72 Under subsection (d), the enterprise is the perpetrator of

or the co-conspirator to the pattern
When properly pleaded, RICO allows
which
assert a theory of liability
"enterprise criminality."7 4 A right to

of racketeering activity.73
a plaintiff or prosecutor to
matches the underlying
a remedy for the damage

activity or collection of unlawful debt.
Id.

The Supreme Court held that the person's conduct and participation must
meet the "Operation or Management Test." Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S.
170, 179 (1993). The Operation or Management Test merely requires that the
RICO "person" participates in the operation and management of the enterprise itself. Id. The Court held that the word "participate" means that RICO
liability is not limited to actions by corporate officers or other high ranking
officials. Id. The enterprise's affairs are conducted by both the upper management and by lower rung employees under the direction of upper management. Id.
In Reves, the receiver of a bankrupt savings and loan sued the savings and
loan's former accountant for allegedly fraudulent accounting practices. Id. at
175. One of the counts of the complaint accused the accounting firm of violating § 1962(c) of the RICO statute. Id. at 176. The accounting firm filed a motion for summary judgement of the RICO count on the theory that the accounting firm did not conduct the Co-op's affairs. Id. at 176. The district
court granted the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. Id.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed both of the lower courts'
decisions. Id. at 177.
The Court held that the accounting firm's failure to fully disclose its accounting practices did not amount to participating in the operation or management of the savings and loan. Id. at 185. The Court further held that the
Operation or Management Test related only to subsection (c) and that this
subsection had a more limited reach than subsection (a) and (b). Id.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994). The text of this subsection is as follows: "(d)
It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section." Id.
69. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 22-23.
70. Id. at 23.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id. at 23.
74. Id. at 23. For example, the enterprise is often characterized as the
beneficiary of the illicit profits derived from a pattern of racketeering activity

under subsection (a). Id.

"Enterprise criminality" is defined as crime committed within the context

of an organization. Susan W. Brenner, Civil Complicity: Using the Pinkerton
Doctrine to Impose Vicarious Liability in Civil RICO Actions, 81 KY. L. J. 369,
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caused by the underlying criminality is the theory behind a civil
RICO action.
D. Civil RICO Remedy
Any person, partnership, association or corporation whose
business or property is injured by a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 has a civil cause of action under
RICO.7 6 Federal courts require the plaintiff to establish a civil
RICO claim by a preponderance of the evidence.77 Although the
civil RICO statute itself makes no mention of a statute of limitations, the Supreme Court has ruled that RICO shares the Clayton
372 (1993). RICO specifically targets not only organized crime, but all enterprise crime. Id. Congress drafted the definitions and substantive offenses of
RICO broadly, knowing that the statute would reach far beyond traditional
organized crime. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985);
Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 6. One of the principal drafters of RICO said
that this broad legislative regime represented an attack on enterprise criminality, not just organized crime. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 6. Indeed, the
legislative history explicitly states that enterprise criminality is not synonymous with organized crime. Id. at 7 n.32 (citing a reference which cites the
legislative history).
75. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 22-23.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) (see supra note 9 for text of statute). "Any
person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id. However, the damage
must be proximately caused by the racketeering activity. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1317 (1992).
The Security Investors Protection Corporation (SIPC) is a federally created, private, nonprofit corporation of which most securities dealers are required to be "members." Id. at 1314. When a securities dealer cannot meet
its obligations to its customers, the SIPC is required to advance up to
$500,000 per customer to satisfy all outstanding claims. Id. Robert Holmes
manipulated the stocks of six SIPC-member companies over a period of seventeen years in order to inflate the stocks' prices. Id. at 1314-15. As a result,
SIPC had to advance trustees nearly $18 million to cover customer claims. Id.
at 1315.
The SPIC claimed that Holmes' actions constituted a pattern of racketeering activity and sued in federal court. Id. The district court granted a motion
by Holmes for summary judgment on the RICO count because Holmes' actions
were not the proximate cause of SIPC's injuries. Id. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, Holmes appealed,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 1315-16.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that SIPC's
injury was not related closely enough to Holmes' RICO violation to support a
cause of action. Id. at 1322. The defendant's violation of RICO must be both
the cause in fact and the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries in order for
the plaintiff to have a cause of action. Id. In civil RICO's scheme of private
attorneys' general, directly injured parties will vindicate societyis interests
thus obviating the need for allowing indirectly injured parties to sue. Id. at
1311.
77. Brenner, supra note 74, at 377.
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8
RICO's civil remAnti-Trust Act's four year statute of limitation."
9
edy allows a plaintiff to recover treble damages plus legal fees.
The treble damages provision encourages "private attorney
generals" to bring suit, compensates the victims of enterprise
crime and acts as an economic disincentive to racketeering activity. o When enacting OCC, Congress deemed that public prosecutorial resources were inadequate to eradicate enterprise crime."'
Therefore, RICO's treble damages provision was intentionally designed to encourage "private attorney generals" to sue for injuries
2
resulting from racketeering activity."
The treble damages provision is also intended to compensate the economically injured victim of racketeering activity. 3 Additionally, the treble damages
provision is designed as an economic disincentive to racketeering
activity.'" Senator McClellan, the bill's chief Senate sponsor, said
that the treble damages provision acts as a potent tool for
"extirpating the baneful influence" of organized crime from the

78. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc. Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 152
(1987).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 487. The original Senate bill sponsored by Senator McClellan did not have a provision calling for a
civil action with treble damages. Id. Section 1964 was added to the RICO bill
in the House Judiciary Committee by Representative Steiger. See Goldsmith,
supra note 41, at 7-8. The provision obviously met with Senate approval because the House and Senate Reconciliation Committee adopted the House
version with no changes, and the Senate subsequently passed the civil action
with treble damages. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488. Among others, the ABA lobbied for the provisions inclusion in RICO. Id. at 487.
80. Holmes, 112 S. Ct. at 1318; Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 151;
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498; United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 574, 585 (1985).
While few of the legislative history comments specifically referred to 1964(c)
(treble damages), all of the provisions of RICO should be considered as novel
remedies attacking racketeering on all sides. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498.
81. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 151.
82. Holmes, 112 S.Ct. at 1318; Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 151. The
carrot of treble damages is used to encourage private attorney generals to sue.
Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 151.
83. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 151.
84. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593. The Court quoted with approval the Senate
Report on OCC:
What is needed here, the committee believes, are new approaches that
will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic base
through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat to the
economic well-being of the Nation. In short, an attack must be made on
their source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on
all available fronts.
Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added). Referring to the treble damages provision of
RICO, the Court stated, "[a]s a general proposition, however, the civil remedies could be useful in eradicating organized crime from the social fabric,
whether the enterprise be ostensibly legitimate or admittedly criminal. The
aim is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains." Id. at 585.
The treble damages provision acts as an economic disincentive to organized
crime. Id.
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economy." Treble damages were designed specifically as an economic disincentive for the lucrative enterprise criminality associated with organized crime.88 The treble damages provisions
worked too well according to some judges; as a7 result, civil RICO
actions incited a great deal of judicial hostility.
E. JudicialHostility Toward the Civil RICO Provision.
Judicial hostility towards RICO exists for a number of interrelated and complex reasons.88 In the early and mid-1980s, many
litigators became aware that RICO was a powerful tool for the victims of white-collar crime.8 9 "The number of civil RICO suits grew
exponentially.., due to the treble damages provision" and the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the statute.
The treble
damages provision encouraged many plaintiffs to plead a RICO
violation predicated on fraud for civil suits arising from ordinary
business disputes such as breach of contract."' Courts did not like
the subsequent large scale federalization of state tort actions.2
85. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488. Senator Byrd heralded the treble damages

provision as striking at the economic base of organized crime. Turkette, 452
U.S. at 592.
86. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 591.
87. Jon H. Kingsepp & Robert B. Johnston, Recent Developments in Commercial Tort Law, 30 TORT & INS. L. J. 262, 263 (1995).

88. Id. at 262-63; Marple, supra note 10, at 351; Goldsmith, supra note 41,
at 2.
89. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 2.
90. Kingsepp & Johnston, supra note 87, at 262. The Supreme Court's
broad interpretation in Turkette created an explosion of civil RICO action at
the district court level. Id. The treble damages provision made RICO a desirable cause of action. Id.
In United States v. Turkette, the Supreme Court held that criminal RICO
remedies were equally useful in combatting enterprise crime, whether the enterprise was legitimate or illegitimate. 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981). In Sedima,
the Court noted that the civil RICO action was intended to combat enterprise
crime, whether the enterprise was legitimate or illegitimate. Cf Sedima, 473
U.S. at 499 (noting that Congress designed RICO to encompass both lawful
and unlawful enterprises and that unlawful enterprises "enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences.").
The Court recognized that its ruling would bring white-collar criminals and
respected businesses within the ambit of the statute. Id.; Goldsmith, supra
note 41, at 14. The Court held that the applicability of civil RICO to legitimate businesses was "inherent in the statute as written" and that Congress
had the sole power to modify or restrict the application of the statute.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499.
91. See Marple, supra note 10, at 351; Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 2.
92. Marple, supra note 10, at 351. The clear applicability of the statute in
a commercial setting made no difference to the majority of judges. Goldsmith,
supra note 41, at 2. Nor did the fact that Congress was cognizant of the expansion of federal law into areas previously reserved for the states. Turkette,
452 U.S. at 586.
The Supreme Court approved of the federalization of state causes of action. Id. at 586. Congress's broad language evinces legislative awareness that
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Also, many judges simply "viewed the [civil RICO] statute as an
organized crime measure run amok."93 Judges were swamped with
a flood of suits and soon grew impatient with the many pleading
errors resulting from the statute's ambiguous text.9 As a result,
district court judges became openly hostile to the civil RICO concept95 and attempted to curtail the use of RICO in 'garden variety'
business disputes.'
Judicial activists narrowly construed RICO, thereby limiting
97
the number of actions which could be remedied under the act. In
1985 and 1986, fifty percent of all civil RICO claims were dismissed.99 An additional 5.9% of the cases were partially dismissed. 99 From 1987 to 1989, sixty-five percent of all civil RICO
actions were dismissed with prejudice during the pre-trial stage.0 °
More recently, an informal study conducted from 1993-94 revealed
that 80% of district court decisions dismissing civil RICO claims at
the pre-trial stage were affirmed at the appellate level."0 ' Out of
all the cases filed in federal court, only a small percentage are
dismissed during the pre-trial stage. 1°2 The high incidence of dismissal for civil RICO actions suggests that the judiciary is using a
very restrictive interpretation of the statute. 0 3 In addition to a restrictive interpretation, federal courts routinely place judicially
enactment of RICO would broaden the domain of federal jurisprudence. Id.
At legislative hearings on RICO, Congress was told that enactment would
move large areas of substantive law, that formerly was solely within the
states' police power, into the "[flederal realm." Id. Congress nonetheless enacted the OCC, knowing that it would alter the divisions of power between the
federal and state governments. Id. Although the Supreme Court's discussion
of RICO's federalizing effect takes place in a criminal context, the broad language of the decision should apply in a civil context as well. Cf. Turkette, 452
U.S. at 583-93.
93. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 2.
94. Kingsepp & Johnston, supra note 87, at 262-63.
95. Id.; Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 2.
96. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 13. Although white-collar crime masquerading as 'garden variety' business disputes burdened society at a rate of more
than $200 billion per year, federal judges were unwilling to use RICO's well
suited civil action as a remedy. Id. at 2-13. The judicial unwillingness to give
effect to the RICO statutes stands in stark contrast to the Supreme Court's
recognition that RICO responds to an emerging situation where persons engaged in long term criminal activity often operate solely within legitimate enterprises. H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249-50
(1988).
97. Kingsepp & Johnston, supra note 87, at 263; Goldsmith, supra note 41,
at 2-3.
98. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 2 n.9.
99. Id. According to another author, between 1970 and 1985, 70% of all
civil RICO suits were either dismissed or were victims of summary judgment.
Kingsepp & Johnston, supra note 87, at 263.
100. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 2 n.9.
101. Kingsepp & Johnston, supra note 87, at 263.
102. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 2 n.9.
103. Id. at 3.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[30:207

created limitations on civil RICO actions."
F. Judicially CreatedCivil RICO Rules
Congress designed RICO to operate without the technical procedural limitations imposed on other analogous civil legislation
such as the Clayton Anti-Trust Act."' Senator John McClellan,
legislative sponsor of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
noted that RICO was derived from the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, but
that Congress had no intent to incorporate within RICO any of the
016
complex restrictions associated with the anti-trust legislation.
Indeed, RICO's text is bereft of any such restrictive language or
complex test."7 Precedents set by the federal district and appeals
courts, however, have burdened RICO with many such limitations.
108
The three most widely adopted judicially created restrictions
imposed upon civil RICO actions are the person-enterprise distinction, °9 the investment injury rule,"' and the limitations on establishing corporate liability."' This Section discusses the rule,
104. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 3. Lower courts have consistently disregarded Supreme Court directives to broadly interpret the RICO statute and

have instead "reined in the [RICO] statute by imposing judicial[ly created]
limitations." Id. at 18.
105. Id. at 3 n.12.
106. Id. Cf Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (noting
that Congress had rejected a previous proposal to append the RICO statute to
the Sherman Act because it would create "inapporopriate and unnecessary
obstacle... [for] a private litigant.").
107. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 3.
108. Id. In Sedima, the Supreme Court struck down two such judicially created rules: a prior conviction requirement and racketeering injury requirement. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488-93; Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 3. In fact,
the Supr eme Court has generally approved RICO's broad reach and disapproved of encumbering limitations. Id.
109. Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.., 6 F.3d 367, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1993); Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1991); Goldsmith, supra
note 41, at 28-30.
110. Patrick D. Hughes, The Investment Injury Requirement in Civil RICO
Section 1962 (A) Actions, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 475, 477 (1992).

111. See Davis, 6 F.3d at 379-80 (holding that the doctrine of respondeat superior was an acceptable theory under which to extend liability to an employer, provided that the requirement of distinctness between the corporate
employer and enterprise was maintained); Schofield v. First Commod. Corp.
of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that respondeat superior would be amenable with a cause of action pled under 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a)); Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984)
(holding that respondeat superior is permissible under any section of RICO,
provided that the enterprise is not a victim of the pattern of racketeering activity). At least three circuits placed limitations on a civil RICO action by
holding that respondeatsuperioris not applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) due to
the person-enterprise distinction. Miranda, 948 F.2d at 45; Yellow Bus Lines,
Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d 782, 790
(D.C. Cir. 1988); D & S Auto Parts v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 967 (7th Cir.
1988).
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rationale and result of each of these restrictions.
1.

The Person-EnterpriseDistinction

The person-enterprise distinction prohibits the enterprise and
person from being the same entity under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).'
Under this subsection, a civil RICO pleading must name as the defendant a RICO person separate and distinct from the RICO enterprise."3 The rule has been almost universally adopted. The
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
and District of Columbia Circuits have explicitly adopted the person-enterprise distinction."" Additionally, the Tenth Circuit has
acknowledged it as a rule of
6 law in dicta."' Only the Eleventh Circuit has rejected the rule."

Proponents assert that the rule is evident from the plain language of the statute."7 Section 1962(c) requires "that [the] culpable person be 'employed by or associated with' the RICO enter112. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 20. In most circuits, the person-enterprise
distinction disallows derivative liability under § 1962(c). Id. Some districts
impose a further pleading requirement: a plaintiff cannot allege that a corporation and its employees are an association-in-fact enterprise other than the
corporation itself, unless there are outside parties privy to the pattern of
racketeering activity. Id. These circuits hold that an extra-corporate conspiracy must exist before a corporation and its employees can be joined as an association-in-fact enterprise. Id. Allowing the employee and corporation to
both be persons who are united in an association-in-fact enterprise would effectively circumvent the distinctness rule under § 1962(c). Id. This additional
prohibition keeps the plaintiff from pleading around the distinctness requirement. Id. The corporate person can be the same entity as the enterprise only
under § 1962(a) and (b). Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 907
(3d Cir. 1991). See infra notes 171-79 and accompanying text for a complete
discussion of association-in-fact enterprises.
113. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 24.
114. Davis, 6 F.3d at 377; Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp, 4 F.3d 1153,
1191 (3d Cir. 1993); Brady v. Dairy Fresh Prod. Co., 974 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th
Cir. 1992); Parker & Parsley Petro. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 583
(5th Cir. 1992); Miranda, 948 F.2d at 44; Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896
F.2d 833, 841 (4th Cir. 1990); Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co.,
884 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1989); Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 789-90; Liquid
Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987); Luthi v. Tonka Corp.,
815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987).
115. Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 1989)
(stating that "corporations generally cannot be both the person and the enterprise under section 1962(c)").
116. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 987-90 (11th Cir. 1982). The
Eleventh Circuit has not overturned the holding of Hartley in any subsequent
ruling. Fototec Intern. Corp. v. Polaroid Corp., 889 F. Supp. 1518, 1525 n.12
(N.D. Ga. 1995).
117. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 29. "Most courts, including the district court
here, have construed the language of this subsection to require that the
'person' who engages in the pattern of racketeering activity be an entity distinct from the 'enterprise.' Id. See supra note 67, for the text of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c).
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prise."" 8 Courts have held that this language means that "the
[same] entity cannot do double duty.""9 For example, a corpora-20
tion cannot be both the enterprise and the liable "person.'
Rather, the statute's language requires a specific relationship between the person performing the predicate felonies and the enterprise: the person is the active wrongdoer while the enterprise is
the passive instrumentality."' Alternatively, the person does the
conducting and the enterprise is conducted.' 22
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the widespread adoption of
the person-enterprise distinction caused a decrease in the number
of civil suits brought under § 1962(c) and a proportional increase
in the number brought under § 1962(a). 12 Before the prevailing
use of the person-enterprise distinction, a vast majority of civil
RICO actions were brought under § 1962(c)."2 Most practitioners
felt that subsection (c) was the simplest and most logical section of
RICO."25 However, the person-enterprise distinction erected an insurmountable obstacle for civil RICO plaintiffs seeking to establish26
corporate liability for an employee's wrongdoing under § 1962(c).1
In such a lawsuit, the majority of courts held that § 1962(c) clearly
required that the corporation be the RICO enterprise. 127 Since the

118. Miranda,948 F.2d at 44.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Continental Data Sys. v. Exxon Corp, 638 F. Supp. 432, 438 (E.D. Pa.
1986).
122. Hughes, supra note 110, at 492.
123. Id. at 491-92. When the number of civil RICO actions exploded in the
mid-1980s, plaintiffs almost exclusively alleged violations of § 1962(c). Id. at
491. Due to judicial imposition of the person-enterprise distinction, the number of actions filed under § 1962(c) fell precipitously in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. Id. at 492. As a result, complaints alleging a violation of §
1962(a) comprised an increasingly large proportion of all civil RICO actions.
Id. at 491.
124. Brenner, supra note 74, at 397.
125. Id.
126. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 25. See infra notes 153-206 and accompanying text for a full discussion of issues pertaining to the establishment of
corporate liability in a civil RICO action.
127. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994) (see supra note 67 for text of statute); Miranda, 948 F.2d at 44-45; Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co., 884
F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1989); Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 25. Courts do not
let corporations be both the person and the enterprise under § 1962(c) because
of the enterprise-person distinction. Miranda, 948 F.2d at 44-45; Kable News,
884 F.2d at 668. Since courts do not allow corporations to be the RICO person, the statute must require that the corporation be denominated as the enterprise in a case arising from the misconduct of the corporations' employee.
Cf Miranda, 948 F.2d at 44-45 (holding that the corporation was the enterprise and not the person); Official Publications,Inc., 884 F.2d at 668 (holding
that the corporation could not be the person because of the person-enterprise
distinction). The only exception is an extra-corporate conspiracy. Goldsmith,
supra note 41, at 34.
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corporation could not be named as both the enterprise and the
RICO person and since liability attached only to the RICO person,12 the person-enterprise distinction effectively barred corporate liability under § 1962(c)." 9 Without the prospect of reaching
the "deep pockets" of the corporate employer, a plaintiff almost
never had financial incentive to sue under § 1962(c).' As a result
of the limitations imposed by the person-enterprise distinction,
many plaintiffs started fashioning causes of action under §
1962(a).13 ' The federal courts soon attached an additional pleading
requirement
on this section in the guise of the investment injury
32
rule.

2.

The Investment Injury Rule

The investment injury rule requires that a plaintiff alleging a
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a) be injured by the defendant's use
or investment of illicit income, not just by the defendant's commission of the predicate felonies.'33 Stated another way, the crux
of the rule is that injuries arising only from the predicate felonies
do not give the plaintiff standing to sue under § 1964(c) 3 4 for a
violation of § 1962(a).'1' Additionally, the majority view is that
merely alleging the reinvestment of illicit income into an enterprise is not sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1964(c) for

128. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (c) (making it "unlawful for any person... to conduct... [an] enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.");
Id. § 1964(c) (allowing plaintiff to recover for violations of § 1962); Goldsmith,
supra note 41, at 25 (noting that (1) a party could not be "the person
/defendant and the RICO enterprise" and (2) the person-enterprise distinction
removed any financial incentive for litigation, because the corporation could
not be held liable).
129. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 25.
130. Id. at 24-28. The person who commits the predicate offenses under
RICO rarely has the assets to afford the plaintiff a full recovery under RICO's
treble damages provision. Brenner, supra note 74, at 377-88. Therefore, in
civil RICO actions arising out of an employee's conduct, plaintiffs try to attach
liability to the corporate employer. Id.
131. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 24-28. Since the person-enterprise distinction precludes plaintiffs from directly naming the corporation as the liable
"person," litigants asserted corporate liability based upon alternative enterprise designations or agency doctrines. Id. at 28. They were largely unsuccessful in formulating a cogent cause of action under § 1962(c) which attached
liability to the corporation. Id. As a result, plaintiffs started using cause of
actions alleging violations of § 1962(a). Id. at 29.
132. Id.
133. Hughes, supra note 110, at 477.
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). This section of RICO gives persons injured by a
violation of § 1962 the right to a civil cause of action. Id. See supra note 9 for
text of statute.
135. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1188 (3d cir. 1993).
The pleading must explain how the plaintiff was injured from the investment
of illicit income, as opposed to merely being injured by the predicate act. Id.
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a violation of § 1962(a). 136 The plaintiff must allege both an investment of racketeering income and an injury resulting from the
investment. 137
The investment injury rule is used in the majority of jurisdictions.138 The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and
139
District of Columbia Circuits have explicitly adopted the rule.
The reasoning employed by the majority concentrates on the relationship between the text of § 1964(c) (the civil remedy provision)
and the phrases "it shall be unlawful" and "to use or invest" in §
1962(a). "' Focusing on the above cited text, the majority of courts
hold that a violation of § 1962(a) requires the actual use or in136. Vicom Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Serv., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 779 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1994). If mere reinvestment were sufficient, the investment injury rule
would be meaningless in most cases. Id. Any pattern of racketeering activity
committed on the behalf of a corporation would establish a § 1962(a) RICO

violation. Id. at 779. In this case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to rule on the investment injury rule. Id. at 779 n.6. Rather, the
court held that the plaintiff mortgagor failed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity by the mortgagee. Id. at 773-78.
137. LightningLube, 4 F.3d at 1188.
138. United States v. Robertson, 73 F.3d 249, 253 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the government must prove that ill-gotten proceeds were used or invested in the acquisition or operation of an enterprise in order to get a criminal conviction under § 1962(a); Compagnie De Reassurance D'Ile De France v.
New England Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 56, 91 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
the plaintiff failed to properly allege an investment injury from the defendant's risk re-insurance scheme); Vemco Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 132
(6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the plaintiff properly plead that the defendant reinvested proceeds received as a result of fraudulently contracting to build a
paint machine, but that plaintiff did not properly plead an injury as a result of
the re-investment); Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1188 (holding that the plaintiff,
a quick lube franchisor, failed to allege how the investment injury was distinct
from the defendant's predicate acts of fraud based on breach of contract and
tortious interference of the contract); Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co., v.
Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that plaintiff, an oil
well owner, whose only injury was from the defendant oil well fracturer's
predicate acts of purposefully under-performing fracturing contract, rather
than from an investment injury); Danielson v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training
Ctr., 941 F.2d 1220, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the plaintiffs,
service employees, failed to state any investment injury arising from the defendant employer's violation of a federal minimum wage act); Ouaknine v.
MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff failed
to state any investment injury arising from the defendant's multiple acts of
real estate fraud); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1151 (10th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff, an oil well owner, failed to state any investment injury arising from the defendant-oil well operator's multiple acts of
conversion, fraud, and breach of contract). Contra Busby v. Crown Supply,
Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff-salespersons
stated a valid § 1962(a) claim against the employer for fraudulently withholding earned commissions, even though the injury was related to predicate acts
and not to the investment of illicit income).
139. See supra note 138 for a discussion of authorities.
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a); Hughes, supra note 110, at 508.
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vestment of income derived through a pattern of racketeering activity. 4 '

Therefore, the majority reasons, a plaintiff alleging a

violation of § 1962(a) must plead an injury arising directly from
the investment of racketeering income because the civil remedy is
only available for injuries caused "by reason of' a violation of §
1962.' *'
Only the Fourth Circuit has explicitly rejected this rule.'
The Fourth Circuit holds that the "by reason of' terminology of §
1964(c) refers to § 1962(a) as a whole.' As a result, the plaintiff
can be injured by either the predicate felonies or by the investment
of illicit income.4 4 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit is concerned
that the investment injury rule is an almost impossible burden for
a plaintiff to overcome. 14

Since the vast majority of plaintiffs fail to properly plead the
investment injury rule, the Fourth Circuit's concern is well
founded.'47 Plaintiffs typically fail to satisfy this rule in one of
three ways: 1) by not alleging any investment injury; 48 2) by alleging an investment injury which is really an injury caused directly
from the predicate felonies; 4 9 or 3) by alleging the investment of
illicit income but not alleging any related injury."u The invest141. Hughes, supra note 110, at 508.
142. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 30-31. See supra notes 9, 65 for text of 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c) and 1962(1) respectively.
143. Busby, 896 F.2d at 837.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 838-39.
147. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 32 n.176. A 1992 index of cases shows
that only four plaintiffs were able to plead in such a way as to overcome the
investment injury rule. Id.
148. Compagnie De Reassurance D'Ile De France v. New england Reinsurance Corp., 57 F.3d 56, 91 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the plaintiffs allegations of fraud were not enough to establish that the plaintiff had been injured
by the defendant's use and investment of the proceeds of the fraudulent conduct); Danielsen v. Burnside-Ott Aviation Training Ctr., Inc., 941 F.2d 1220,
1229 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that under § 1962(a) a plaintiff "must plead and
prove that his injury flowed from the defendant's use or investment of racketeering income," and finding that plaintiff did not make any such allegation);
Ouaknine v. MacFarlane, 897 F.2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir 1990) (holding that the
plaintiff failed to plead that the alleged injury was the result of the defendants' investment of illicit income).
149. Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1188 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that even though plaintiff alleged an investment injury, the plaintiff
failed to distinguish how its injury was the result of the use or investment of
racketeering income as opposed to resulting from the predicate acts themselves); Parker & Parsely Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 584
(5th cir. 1992) (holding that complaint and RICO case statement obviously alleged only injuries flowing directly from predicate felonies, even though the
plaintiff pleaded injury from the investment of racketeering income).
150. Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 132-33 (6th cir. 1994) (holding
that although Vemco alleged reinvestment of racketeering income, it failed to
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ment injury rule in conjunction with the person-enterprise distinction effectively forecloses the civil RICO option to most plaintiffs injured by "garden variety fraud. 1.. However, plaintiffs in
most civil RICO suits arising from business disputes have yet an
additional set of judicially imposed requirements to overcome in
order
to receive full compensation: limitations on corporate liabil52
ity.'
3. Limitations on CorporateLiability
In order to fully realize the promise of civil RICO's treble
damages, a plaintiff must sue an entity with a "deep pocket. " " -In
a civil RICO action the "deep pocket" is often the corporate employer of the person who commits the predicate RICO felonies.'
Therefore, in order to fully realize the promise of civil RICO's
treble damages provision, the plaintiff must find some theory with
which to attach liability on the corporation." The limitations on
corporate liability within the civil RICO context can be divided
into two broad categories: establishing direct
corporate liability
56
and establishing vicarious corporate liability.1
a.

Limitations on Direct Corporate Liability

In order to attach direct liability on a corporate "person," a
high ranking employee must commit the predicate felonies or conspire with or counsel another to commit the felonies."57 Corporations are civilly and criminally liable "for the malicious torts or
crimes of officers."" 8 The high level officers, directors and employees embody the corporation's conscience because they control the
corporation's authority." 9 The test for a person of authority is
allege any injury stemming from the reinvestment); Grider v. Texas Oil & Gas
Corp., 868 F.2d 1147, 1149-51 (10th cir. 1989) (holding that the plaintiff did
not allege any investment injury even though the plaintiffs complaint clearly
alleges the defendant's reinvestment of racketeering income). Some feel that
the investment injury rule improperly denies relief to the vast majority of
victims pleading a § 1962(a) violation. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 29.
151. Hughes, supra note 110, at 511-12.
152. Brenner, supra note 74, at 377-88.
153. Id. at 388.
154. Cf id. at 377-88 (discussing (1) how plaintiffs want to sue the person or
entity with "deep pocket[s]" and (2) the theories for attaching vicarious liability to the corporate employer of the actual wrongdoer).
155. Id. at 377-88.
156. Id. at 389.
157. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 909 (3d Cir. 1991); R.E.
Davis Chem. Corp. v. Nalco Chem. Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1499, 1522 (N.D. Ill.
1990); Brenner, supra note 74, at 381-84.
158. Genty, 937 F.2d at 909.
159. See id. A corporation cannot act but through its employees. Roboserve,
Inc. v. Kato Kagaku Co., 873 F. Supp. 1124, 1139 (N.D. 111. 1995). The high
level employees, officers and directors, are thought to not only embody the
corporation, but also the corporations conscience. Id. Therefore, any act
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whether one has such responsibility as to arouse the institutional
conscience through acts or ratifications.'o Under federal complicity law, one is liable as a principle if one aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures an offense.16' Additionally, if intentional wrongdoing is within the scope of employment for a specific employee, then the employer's liability is direct. 62 The
Schreiber Rule encompasses many of these precepts by holding
that a corporation engaging in and benefitting from a pattern of
racketeering activity can be both the person and enterprise under
§ 1962(a).161 Under the Schreiber rule, corporate liability attaches
directly."M Attaching direct corporate liability under 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) is much more restrictive than under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a),
(b) and (d).
As discussed above, the person- enterprise distinction
gener65
ally bars the corporation from being named the RICO person.'
Unfortunately, liability only attaches to the RICO person. 6 Under
§ 1962(c), the corporation/enterprise is a passive instrumentality
which cannot be held liable. 67 The distinctness rule shelters even
culpable enterprises from liability under this section."
After the distinctness rule became prevalent, many plaintiffs
tried to circumvent it by alleging an association-in-fact enterprise 169 which consisted exclusively of the corporate employer and
the culpable employees.' 7' Since the corporation was not the enwhich is committed by or acquiesced to by a high level employee is imputed to
the corporation itself. Cf. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th
Cir. 1987) (noting that liability for an employee's wrongdoing may be imputed
to the corporate employer if the conduct (1) was related to the wrongdoer's
employement, (2) benefitted the corporation and (3) was acquiesced to by the
corporation); Roboserve, 873 F. Supp. at 1139 (noting that the complicity doctrine "allow[s] punitive damages where the institutional conscience of the corporate master should [have] be[en] aroused.").
160. Roboserve, 875 F. Supp. at 1139. The crimes of high ranking corporate
officials are assumed to be those of the corporation itself because "corruption
which reaches the upper echelons of the corporation assumes the imprimatur
of corporate policy." R.E. Davis Chem. Corp., 757 F. Supp. at 1522.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); Brenner, supra note 74, at 383-85.
162. Brenner, supra note 74, at 394.
163. Id. at 391 n.138.
164. Id.
165. Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1991).
166. Cf.id.
167. Id.
168. Schofield v. First Commod. Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 31 (1st Cir.
1986).
169. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 574, 583 (1985). An association-infact enterprise is a group of individuals or entities which engages in a course
of conduct for a common purpose. Id. The test for an association-in-fact enterprise is: (1) an on-going organization, (2) comprised of members functioning as a continuing unit, and (3) which has an existence separate and distinct
from the pattern of racketeering activity. Id.
170. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 34.
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terprise per se, the corporation could be named as the liable RICO
person.'
Courts quickly ruled against plaintiffs using this approach.'
Courts held that a group comprised solely of an employer and its employees is a single legal entity. 17 Naming employees and the corporation as an enterprise does not change the
fact that the corporation acts only through its employees.'
Under
§ 1962(c), a corporation cannot join exclusively with its own employees to constitute an enterprise distinct from itself.7 5 As a result, courts held that the corporation must be the enterprise and
17
cannot be the person even when an association-in-fact is alleged. 1
The only way to name a corporation as a RICO person is to allege
an association-in-fact enterprise encompassing an extra-corporate
conspiracy. 177
The rationale for limiting direct corporate liability under civil
RICO is straightforward. Although RICO has a civil cause of action, it is largely a criminal statute. 17 The requirements for attaching direct corporate liability in a civil RICO action are merely
those associated with attaching criminal culpability on a corporation under federal criminal law. 9 Often, the corporation is not
intimately enough linked with the predicate acts to be directly liable.6'
In such a case, the plaintiff needs to establish vicarious
corporate liability."'
b.

Limitations on Vicarious Corporate Liability
Derivative corporate liability in the civil RICO context usually
focuses on the use of respondeat superior.'12 Respondeat superioris
a common law agency rule'8 ' in which one who is without fault is
assigned vicarious liability for the wrongdoing of another." Gen-

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 377 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id.
Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 34.
Brenner, supra note 74, at 370.

179. Cf Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 909 (3d Cir. 1991);
R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Nalco Chem. Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1499, 1522 (N.D.
Ill. 1990); Brenner, supra note 74, at 381-84.
180. Cf Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato Kagaku Co., 873 F. Supp. 1124, 1138 (N.D.

Ill. 1995) (noting that if an act is done by a person who has "such responsibility as to arouse the 'institutional conscience,' the act binds the coporation as a
participant").
181. Id. at 388.
182. E.g., Schofield v. First Commod. Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 32 (1st
Cir. 1986); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir. 1987);
Bernstein v. IDT Corp., 582 F. Supp. 1079, 1083 (D. Del. 1984).
183. Bernstein, 582 F. Supp. at 1083.
184. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 32. The rationale behind respondeatsuperior is
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erally, normal rules of agency law apply in the absence of a clear
indication that Congress had a contrary intent.' 5 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is responsible for injuries
caused by an employee acting within the scope of the employee's
employment. 8 An employer is not liable for conduct outside the
scope of employment unless: 1) the employer intended for the conduct to occur; 2) the employer was negligent or reckless in supervising the employee; 3) the conduct violated a non-delegatable
duty on the part of the employer; or 4) the employee purported to
speak for the employer or was acting with apparent authority.'"
In a civil RICO suit, respondeatsuperior imposes vicarious liability
on the corporation/enterprise for the wrongdoing of the employee/person 8 8 The restrictions on the application of respondeat
superior in a civil RICO action need to be handled separately for
part (c) as opposed to part (a) of § 1962.
In the majority of circuits which have considered the question,
respondeatsuperior is generally inapplicable to civil actions alleging a violation of § 1962(c). 8 9 Five circuits, the First, Third, Seventh, Eighth and the District of Columbia, have held that respondeat superior can never be applied under this section because
doing so would violate the person-enterprise distinction.' 9° The

that "it would be unjust to permit an employer to gain from the intelligent cooperation of others without being responsible for the mistakes, the errors of
judgment and the frailties of those working under his direction and for his
benefit." Petro.Tech, 824 F.2d at 1358.
185. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 31.
186. Brenner, supra note 74, at 377; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th

ed. 1990).
187. Brenner, supra note 74, at 378-79. The Supreme Court has held that
the doctrine of apparent authority could impose liability on a defendant in an
action seeking treble damages. American Soc. of Mech. Engr's, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575-76 (1982).
188. Cf Schofield, 793 F.2d at 29-33 (noting that the plaintiff acknowledged
the validity of the person-enterprise rule and instead tried to hold the corporation liable using the doctrine of respondeatsuperiour).
189. Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1991); Yellow
Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839 F.2d
782, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1988); D & S Auto Parts v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 967
(7th Cir. 1988); Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 F.2d 1349, 1358 (3d Cir.
1987); Luthi v. Tonka Corp., 815 F.2d 1229, 1230 (8th Cir. 1987).
190. Miranda,948 F.2d at 45 (holding that respondeat superior is not applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because of the requirement of distinctness between person and enterprise); Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 790 (holding that
respondeat superior is not applicable to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) because of the requirement of distinctness between person and enterprise); D & S Auto, 838
F.2d at 967 (holding that respondeat superioris not applicable to 18 U.S.C. §
1962(c) because of the requirement of distinctness between person and enterprise); Petro-Tech, Inc., 824 F.2d at 1358 (holding that respondeat superior
may not be used to hold a RICO enterprise liable under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c));
Luthi, 815 F.2d at 1230 (declining to apply respondeat superior to a RICO
claim brought under § 1962(c)).
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corporate enterprise cannot be the same entity as the liable RICO
person under this section." 1 The Sixth and Ninth Circuits have a
narrower but analogous holding in that respondeat superior cannot
be applied where the defendant corporation is also the RICO enterprise because doing so would violate the person-enterprise distinction.1 9 In these two circuits, vicarious liability can be imposed
on a corporate defendant under § 1962(c) if doing so does not violate the distinctness rule and if the corporation benefitted from the
wrongdoing. 193 The reasoning behind both versions of the majority
rule is that a plaintiff should not be able to do indirectly what the
person-enterprise distinction precludes from being accomplished
directly. 94 No circuit court has specifically held that a corporate
enterprise could be held vicariously liable under § 1962(c). Fewer
circuits have addressed the issue of vicarious liability with respect
to § 1962(a).
Two circuits, the Third and the District of Columbia, have
held that respondeat superior is always applicable under §
1962(a). 95 The Seventh Circuit has held that respondeatsuperior
is applicable under this section, provided that the corporate defendant benefitted from and acquiesced to the employee's wrongdoing."1 Two other circuits, the First and the Second, suggested in
197
dicta that respondeat superior is applicable under subsection (a).
The reasoning behind the majority holding is that § 1962(a) is
more broadly applicable than § 1962(c), and therefore, a corporation can be both person and enterprise under the former section. 98
As a result, respondeat superior can attach.9 9 Although minimal
case law on point exists, precedent suggests that respondeat superior would attach under subsection 1962(b) like it does under subsection 1962(a) and would be inapplicable under subsection
1962(d) like it is under 1962(c)." 0
Since RICO is a quasi-criminal statute, some courts have
voiced concerns that using vicarious liability departs from traditional principles of criminal responsibility. 2 1 These concerns are

191. Continental Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 638 F. Supp. 432, 438-39
(E.D. Pa. 1986).
192. Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 377 (6th Cir. 1993); Brady v.
Dairy Fresh Prod. Co., 974 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1992).
193. Davis, 6 F.3d at 379; Brady, 974 F.2d at 1154.
194. Schofield v. First Commod. Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir.
1986).

195. Yellow Bus Lines, 839 F.2d at 790; Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1360.
196. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987).
197. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 33; Official Publications, Inc. v. Kable News Co.,
884 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1989).
198. Schofield, 793 F.2d at 33.

199. Id.
200. See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 907 (3d Cir. 1991).
201. Brenner, supra note 74, at 370.
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generally unfounded.2" When the respondeat superior doctrine is
applied to criminal cases, it automatically protects innocent or
passive parties."' A threshold requirement for vicarious liability
in a criminal case is that the agent intends to confer a benefit upon
the principal ' ' Furthermore, criminal conduct is not necessarily
outside the scope of employment.0 5 Like the person-enterprise
distinction and the investment injury rule, the limitations on establishing corporate liability have greatly restricted the applicability of civil RICO.2
While this Part discussed the origin of RICO, the statutory
RICO mechanisms, and the restrictive effect of current RICO case
law, the next Part discusses the applicability of RICO to the misappropriations of trade secrets problem. Specifically, Part III will
conclude that a successful civil RICO action can still be framed in
the hypothetical misappropriation of trade secrets case and that
policy considerations support this use of RICO.
III. APPLICABILITY OF RICO TO MISAPPROPRIATIONS OF TRADE
SECRETS CAUSES OF ACTION

Congress designed RICO to eradicate enterprise crime, specifically organized crime."s7 The misappropriation of trade secrets
is a burgeoning enterprise crime problem.20 8 The remedies provided by RICO are tailor-made for the trade-secrets theft problem.
First, this Part examines public policy considerations which support the use of civil RICO in misappropriation of trade secrets
cases. This Part then outlines how a misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action fits the most restrictive judicially imposed
RICO limitations.
202. Cf. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 29 (noting that the "respondeatsuperior doctrine in criminal cases exempts from liabity any principal that is a
victim or passive instrumentality of criminality").
203. Id.
204. Id. at 28-29.
205. Brenner, supra note 74, at 370.
206. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 19-38.
207. Id. at 8.
208. Cf H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989)
(noting that "Congress wanted to reach both 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises" and that "[1legitimate businesses 'enjoy neither an ingerent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences"); Toren, supra
note 3, at 62 (noting that trade secrets theft is increasint); Quintanilla, supra
note 7, at B1 (noting that many companies now actively attempt to misappropriate trade secrets from competitors). "TItle 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) responds to
a new situation in which persons engaged in long term criminal activity often
operate wholly within legitimate enterprises." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 248.
Most trade secrets are misappropriated by current or former employees.
Toren, supra note 3, at 61 n. 8. Many companies now actively attempt to misappropriate the trade secrets of economic competitors. Quintanilla, supra
note 7, at B1.
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A. Public Policy Considerations

A sound policy for deterring the misappropriation of trade secrets is to encourage the use of civil RICO actions. This Section
discusses the public policy considerations which support such a
use: 1) parallels exist between trade secrets theft and the congressional findings which prefaced the OCC; 2) civil RICO is designed
as an economic deterrent to enterprise crime; 3) trade secret theft
is enterprise crime when used as a company's way of doing business; and 4) Congress desired that RICO be liberally construed
when it passed the OCC.
America's problem with misappropriated trade secrets shares
many themes with the problems which prompted the enactment of
RICO. In 1970, Congress found that organized crime was widespread and that it cost the American economy billions of dollars." 9
Today, the misappropriation of trade secrets is widespread and it
is draining billions of dollars from the economy annually.2 0 Nearly
fifty percent of American companies surveyed stated that they are
the victims of trade secret theft each year.2 1'
In 1970, Congress found that organized crime derived a major
portion of its power from illegally obtained money.21' Similarly, all
money made using misappropriated trade secrets is by definition
illegally obtained."' The old adage that money is power still holds
true in business, suggesting that the beneficiaries of misappropriated trade
secrets are deriving substantial power from illegal ac214
tivity.

In 1970, Congress found that organized crime used illegally
obtained money to corrupt and infiltrate legitimate businesses. 5
Similarly, a company which uses a stolen trade secret, knowingly
or unknowingly, has been infiltrated and corrupted by criminals." 6
209. OCC, 84 STAT. 922-23 (1970).
210. Toren, supra note 3, at 62; Bellinger, supra note 15, at 126.
211. Cf. Williams, supra note 19.
212. OCC, 84 STAT. 922-23 (1970).

213. Misappropriation is the "unlawful use of funds or other property for
purposes other than which intended." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 998 (6th ed.
1990).
214. Cf Gregory K. Bader, The Keiretsu Distribution System of Japan: Its
Steadfast Existence Despite Heightened Foreign and Domestic Pressure for
Dissolution, 27 CORNELL L. REv. 365, 386 n.7 (1964) (noting that during the

Hearing on Economic Concentration before the Subcommittee on Anti-Trust
and Monopoly of the Senate Judiciary Committee (88th Congress), Professor
Corwin D. Edwards stated that a big firm has an advantage just by being big).
215. OCC, 84 STAT. 922-23 (1970).
216. Infiltrate means to penetrate a group gradually or stealthily.
WEBSTER'S II COLLEGE WORLD DICTIONARY 568 (2d 1995). To corrupt an institution is to change the institution's morals and principles from good to bad.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 345 (6th ed. 1990). A malum in se crime is one

which is wrong and immoral in itself. Id. at 959. Theft is a malum in se offense. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 237 n.10 (1§51) (Jackson, J., dis-
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In 1970, Congress found that organized crime activity weakened the economy and injured individual companies."' Today, the
misappropriation of trade secrets is burdening the economy and
hurting individual companies. 18 Individual companies lose billions
of dollars annually to trade-secrets theft.1 9 Six million people have
lost their jobs in just the past six years due to the misappropriation of trade secrets. 2 0 The cumulative effect is a serious drain on
the economy.2 2'
In 1970, Congress found that organized crime was continuing
•
222
•

to grow and that existing law enforcement tools were ineffective.
Many indicia suggest that trade secrets theft is growing and the
current remedies for trade secret theft are inadequate. The misappropriation of trade secrets has tripled in the last two years.
Companies which are victims of the misappropriation of trade secrets are reluctant to bring criminal charges because of perceptions that prosecutors lack the requisite technical expertise. 24
Perpetrators view the civil penalties imposed by the justice system
as just another cost of doing business.2 5 Prior to the recent enactment of The Economic Espionage Act, experts admitted that existing law enforcement tools were inadequate. 2 ' The Economic Espionage Act is of such recent genesis that its effect on trade secrets
theft is purely speculative. 227 The concerns that led Congress to
22

senting). Theft is wrong in and of itself, and it is a sign of moral turpitude.
Id. Since corporations only act through their employees and since theft is a
sign of moral turpitude, corporations which use stolen trade secrets are corrupted. Cf Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 34 (stating that corporations only act
through their employees). Legitimate corporations which are unaware of the
illegal activities of its employees are by definition being infiltrated.
WEBSTER'S, supra.
217. OCC, 84 STAT. 922-23 (1970).
218. See, e.g., Toren, supra note 3, at 62; Bellinger, supra note 15, at 126.

219. Toren, supra note 3, at 62 (citing an annual cost to American firms
from the misappropriation of trade secrets of $1.8 billion); Bellinger, supra
note 15, at 126 (citing an annual cost to American firms of $15 billion); Gertz,
supra note 17 (citing a monthly cost to American firms of $2 billion dollars,
representing a cost of approximately $24 billion annually); Martin, supra note

3, at 949 (citing an annual cost to American firms of nearly $20 billion).
220. Anderson, supra note 18, at 16.
221. Cf id (noting that economic espionage has cost American businesses

billions of dollars and workers millions of jobs).
222. OCC, 84 STAT. 922-23 (1970).
223. Quintanilla, supra note 7.
224. Toren, supra note 3, at 59-60 n. 3.

225. Bagley et al., supra note 8, at 458.
226. See Eisele, supra note 25, at 34. Cf The Econ. Espionage Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 101, 110 Stat. 3488, available in Westlaw PL 104-294,
at *1 (1996) (making economic espionage a federal offense); Lynch, supra note
5 (noting that in a trade secrets theft cases legal fees for civil causes of action
average $500,000).
227. See generally The Econ. Espionage Act, at *1-4 (showing that the law
was enacted on October 11, 1996).
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enact the OCC closely parallel the current problems that the legal
system is having with trade secrets theft. Moreover, additional
public policy considerations support the use of a civil RICO cause
of action in a misappropriation of trade secrets case.
Congress designed the civil RICO action to deter enterprise
crime, and trade secrets theft is often enterprise crime. When
Congress drafted the OCC, it designed the civil RICO action as an
economic deterrent aimed specifically at enterprise crime. 22' Today, an increasing number of companies are using the misappropriation of trade secrets as a way of doing business (i.e. as an enterprise crime.) 29
In defining racketeering activity broadly,
Congress "acknowledge[d] the breakdown of the traditional conception of organized crime and respond[ed] to a new situation in
which persons engaged in long-term criminal activity often operate
wholly within legitimate enterprises." 20 These legitimate enterprises "enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity
nor immunity from its consequences." 2 1 Since economic considerations are driving the misappropriations of trade secrets, 232 an
economic disincentive should be tried.
Lastly, Congress's own words implore the courts to construe
the statute liberally. 33 Congress has a long history of acquiescing
to the extension of civil RICO actions into the area of business
torts. 24 The Supreme Court noted Congress's desire to give RICO
a broad interpretation; it held that such an interpretation is constitutional and that courts should interpret the statute broadly. 2 5
For all of these reasons, the victims of trade secrets thefts should
be encouraged to use civil RICO actions.
B. Application of a Civil RICO Action to WEE Co. v. USEME, Inc.
The hypothetical proposed in the introduction is admittedly
contrived. However, it effectively illustrates that a misappropriation of trade secrets can be remedied under RICO. This section
proposes two complaints based on the hypothetical fact pattern
and then discusses how these complaints overcome RICO's restrictive, judicially imposed rules.

228. OCC, 84 STAT. 922-23 (1970); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
591-93 (1981).

229. See McDermott, supra note 7, at 31; Quintanilla, supra note 7.
230. H.J., Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989).
231. Id. at 249 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479,
499 (1985)).
232. See Toren, supra note 3, at 59-64.
233. OCC, 84 STAT. 922, 947 (1970).
234. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 592-93.
235. Id.
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Complaint Filed by WEE Co.

A complaint in Federal court must state the basis of jurisdiction, give a short and plain statement of the claim which shows the
23 6
plaintiff is entitled to relief, and make a demand for judgement.
District courts of the United States have original jurisdiction for
any civil RICO action. 2 7 The complaint may read as follows:

1. The person USEME, Inc. derived illicit income, either directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity conducted by
USEME, Mr. Big, Mr. Craft, Mr. Yew, and Mr. Smith in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). The pattern of racketeering activity included: 1)
.multiple occurrences of interstate shipment of stolen goods; 2) multiple occurrences of receiving stolen goods; and 3) one occurrence of
wire fraud during which Mr. Yew used the telephone to intentionally and fraudulently procure a sick day benefit from WEE Co. The
goods stolen consisted of converted office products such as computer
diskettes and copy paper and the trade secrets affixed to the office
products. The value of the stolen goods exceeded $5000. USEME
used and invested the money so obtained in the operation of
USEME, the enterprise. The pattern of racketeering activity is
continuous in that it is Mr. Craft's and USEME's way of doing business, and it is related in that it has a common goal (the theft of
trade secrets) and a common modus operandi (the recruitment of respective employees in such a manner as to induce them to steal
trade secrets from their former bosses). USEME's investment of illicit income injured WEE Co. in two ways: 1) USEME invested
money in developing stolen WEE Co. product designs which directly
competed with WEE Co.; and 2) USEME invested money by placing
orders with WEE Co.'s low cost suppliers, thereby displacing WEE
Co. with these suppliers and damaging WEE Co.'s cost structure.
WEE Co. prays for actual damages of $1,000,000, to be trebled, plus
legal expenses from USEME, Inc. USEME, Inc.'s liability results
from the direct participation of high corporate employees, Mr. Big
and Mr. Craft.
An alternative or additional complaint may read as follows:

236. FED. R. CIV. P 8(a) (1995).
Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets for a claim for relief, whether
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the
court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction
and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
Id.

237. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1994). "Any civil action or proceeding under this
chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of the
United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has an
agent, or transacts his affairs." Id.
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2. Mr. Craft, Mr. Big and USEME, Inc. have conducted the affairs
of an associated-in-fact enterprise comprised at least of Mr. Craft,
Mr. Big, Mr. Smith, Mr. Yew and USEME, Inc. through a pattern of
racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The structure of the enterprise is similar to the structure of USEME, Inc., except that extra-corporate participants are used on an "as-needed"
basis to steal trade secrets.2 38 The pattern of racketeering activity
included: 1) multiple occurrences of interstate shipment of stolen
goods; 2) multiple occurrences of receiving stolen goods; and 3) one
occurrence of wire fraud during which Mr. Yew used the telephone
to intentionally and fraudulently procure a sick day benefit from
WEE Co. The goods stolen consisted of converted office products
such as computer diskettes and copy paper and the trade secrets affixed to the office products. The value of the stolen goods was in excess of $5000. The pattern of racketeering activity is continuous in
that it is Mr. Craft's and USEME's way of doing business, and it is
related in that it has a common goal (the theft of trade secrets) and
a common modus operandi (the recruitment of respective employees
in such a manner as to induce them to steal trade secrets from their
soon-to-be-former bosses). This pattern of racketeering activity has
injured WEE Co. in its property and business. WEE Co. prays for
actual damages of $1,000,000, to be trebled, plus legal expenses
from USEME, Inc. USEME, Inc.'s liability results from the direct
participation of high corporate employees, Mr. Big and Mr. Craft.
Either of these sample complaints should be sufficient to
overcome the judicially imposed civil RICO restrictions.
2. Overcoming the Judicially Created Civil RICO Rules
In order to state a claim, WEE Co. must allege: 1) a RICO
person; 2) an enterprise; 3) the requisite number of predicate felonies; and 4) a connection by a pattern of racketeering activity.23 9 In
addition, WEE Co. must allege that the pattern of racketeering is
continuous and related.' 0° When alleging a violation of § 1962(a),
WEE Co. must plead an injury arising from the investment of illicit income." When alleging a violation of § 1962(c), WEE Co.
must plead an association-in-fact enterprise comprising an extracorporate conspiracy in order to meet the person-enterprise distinction requirement and still attach liability to USEME, Inc."2 In
order to receive full compensation, WEE Co. must attach liability,
either directly or vicariously, to USEME, Inc. 42
Both complaints plead persons, an enterprise, and a pattern
238. Six circuits require that a plaintiff plead an ascertainable structure for
an association-in-fact enterprise. Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.
1996).

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-62 (1994).
H.J., Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989).
See United States v. Robertson, 73 F.3d 249, 251 (9th Cir. 1996).
See Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 33.
Brenner, supra note 74, at 388.
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of racketeering activity in accordance with the RICO statute.

244

The complaints allege the requisite number of predicate felonies,2 5
4 6
The inand the fraud allegation is pleaded with particularity.
terstate shipment and receipt of stolen goods allegations allege
that the goods were transported across state lines and were worth
more than $5000.247

The pattern of racketeering meets the re-

quirement of continuity and relationship because: 1) it is, in effect,
USEME's way of doing business (establishing the threat that the
future);4 1
pattern of racketeering activity may be repeated in the
and 2) the predicate felonies have similar or related methods, participants, and results.249
Complaint number one alleges an injury arising only from the
investment of illicit income and not from the predicate acts themselves. Indeed, WEE Co. can argue that although the theft of the
trade secrets was perfected by the time Mr. Yew quit WEE Co., no
resultant injury occurred until such time as USEME invested and
developed said secrets. 250 Additionally, the injury that WEE Co.
suffered is exactly the type of injury that § 1962(a) prohibits.
Congress designed § 1962(a) as an anti-money laundering

244. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-62 (1994).
245. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
246. FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (1995). "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.
Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally." Id.
247. National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1994) (prohibiting the
interstate shipment of stolen goods); 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (1994) (prohibiting the
receipt of stolen goods shipped in interstate commerce); Bagley et al., supra
note 8, at 459. A violation of the National Stolen Property Act has five elements: 1) the items were transported across state lines; 2) the items were
"goods, wares or merchandise within the meaning of the statute"; 3) the value
of the items had a value in excess $5000; 4) the "defendant knew the items
were stolen"; and 5) "the items were stolen, converted or taken by fraud." Id.
In order for a trade secret to be considered a "good" under this section, it must
be in tangible form such as a piece of paper. Id.
248. See H.J., Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 242-43.
Continuity plus relatedness combine to produce a pattern of racketeering activity. Id. at 239. Open-ended continuity refers to past conduct which by its
nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition. Id. at 241. The
threat of repetition is established by showing that the predicate felonies are a
regular way of conducting the defendant's on-going, legitimate business. Id.
at 242. Criminal acts are related if they share "similiar purposes, results,
participants, victims or methods of commissions." Id. at 240.
249. Id.
250. Cf Lockridge v. Tweco Prods., Inc., 497 P.2d 131, 135-36 (Kan. 1972).
The misappropriation of a trade secret causes an injury either at the time of
the misappropriation or at the time of the first use. Id. The injury is not
continuing. Id. It is "a fixed, palpable, ascertainable and nonrecurring
event." Id. at 137. WEE Co.'s injury occurred at the time USEME, Inc.
started using the trade secrets. Only then was the injury ascertainable and
palpable.
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provision aimed at preventing criminal enterprises from unfairly
competing with legitimate businesses.2 5 ' USEME's development of
the trade secrets was an attempt to legitimize "ill-gotten fruits" in
much the same way as money laundering is an attempt to legitimize ill-gotten cash.52 Under § 1962(a), the enterprise is characterized as the beneficiary of the enterprise criminality because it
receives illicit profits.252 USEME is clearly benefitting from the receipt of illicit income derived by the development and use of misappropriated trade secrets.
In complaint number two, WEE Co. alleges an association-infact enterprise consisting of Mr. Smith, Mr. Yew, Mr. Craft, Mr.
Big and USEME. WEE Co. can allege an extra-corporate conspiracy because Mr. Yew and Mr. Smith were not employees of
USEME, Inc. at the time they respectively stole trade secrets.2 8
By arguing an extra-corporate conspiracy, WEE Co. will be using
the one permissible formulation of a § 1962(c) violation which does
not have USEME as the enterprise.2 5 , In this way, WEE Co. can
attach liability, directly or indirectly, on USEME.
USEME's liability can be both direct and vicarious. Mr. Big
knew about the misappropriation and acquiesced, thus establishing at least vicarious liability. 5 6 Direct liability can be argued for
two reasons: 1) Mr. Craft was an officer of such high stature that
his conduct should have aroused the corporate conscience, 57 and 2)
Mr. Craft's illegal conduct was part of his defined responsibilities.5 8

251. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 29.
252. Cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 884 (6th ed. 1990). Laundering is defined

as the investment or "transfer of money flowing from racketeering, drug
transactions, and other illegal sources into legitimate channels." Id.
253. Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 23.
254. See id. at 33.
255. See id.
256. See Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that a corporation which benefits from and acquiesces to an employee's wrongdoing may be held vicariously liable under § 1962(a)); see also
Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, 839

F.2d 782, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that vicarious liability is applicable
under § 1962(a)).

257. Cf Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 909 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that in order to attach direct liability on a corporate "person", a high
rankng employee must commit the predicate felonies or conspire with or
counsel another to commit the felonies); Roboserve, Inc. v. Kato Kagaku Co.,
873 F. Supp. 1124, 1138 (N.D. 111. 1995) (noting that when an act is committed

by a "person of such responsibility as to arouse the 'institutional conscience,"'
the commission binds the corporation as a participant).
258. Brenner, supra note 74, at 394. If the tortious or culpable conduct of an
employee is understood to be within the scope of that employee's employment,
corporate liability can be direct. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The misappropriations of trade secrets is a serious and growing problem for the U.S. economy. Unfortunately, the currently
used law enforcement tools and techniques are inadequate to
eradicate the problem. Since the problem of trade-secrets theft is
analogous to the problem of organized crime which inspired the
OCC, the civil RICO provision might be a useful tool in eradicating
trade secret theft. Before a wholesale eradication occurs, the misappropriation of trade secrets cause of action must overcome judicially imposed civil RICO restrictions.
As illustrated above, trade-secret theft is enterprise criminality, RICO is designed to eradicate enterprise criminality, and a
properly pleaded misappropriation of trade secrets complaint can
easily overcome all of the judicially imposed restrictions on civil
RICO.

